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Macroeconomic Instability and the Strategies of
Transnational Corporations in Brazil: Standstill,
Retrenchmentor Divestment?
1, Introduction
The strategies of enterprises depend on the interaction of
heterogeneous factors at different levels (product line,
competitors, market contestability, buyers, suppliers, targets,
evaluation of the environment, ownership-specific advantages
and disadvantages, the values of the decision-makers,etc)!.
Hence, the impact of macroeconomic instability in particular
circumstances needstobe carefully assessed on acase-by-case
basis.
The general definition ofstrategy, which underlies the analysis
in this study,is that “strategy includes a set of decisions on the
relative choiceregardingtheuse and thevalorizationofresources”.
With respect to the strategic behaviour ofTNCs,it is relevant
to keep in mind that it depends not only upongoals andtargets,
butalsoonthepredominanceofdifferent, althoughcomplementary,
perspectives. The “industrial strategy” aims at strengthening the
competitiveness through the choice of technology and products,
as well as market control; whereas, the “financial strategy”
emphasizes the managementofthefirm’s assets®. In the context
ofmacroeconomicinstability,it is also important to consider the
trade strategies of TNCs which have a bearing on balance-of-
Payments adjustment.
The basic objective of this study is to analyze the strategicreactions ofTNCsvis-a-visthe macroeconomicinstabilityofBrazilsince the early 1980s. The central argument is that, although
mes are still keeping a “qualified optimism” with respect to the
economy, they seem to have adopted, in general, aretrenchment strategywith respect to Brazil in the recentpast.
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There are some reasons for that, much morerelated to pastexperience than future prospects.
The behaviour of TNCs involve different combinations ofstrategies. Here, the scope for generalization is very limited.However, in the context oflong-term macroeconomic instability,itis likelythatthere is apredominanceofthe financial and tradestrategies over the industrial strategy. Given the significantpermussiveness of the domestic market and the trade barriersetethe argument can be advanced that TNCs have been
re prompt in adopti i i
dereLina opting financial strategies than
The nature of the Brazilian macroeconomic instability (in aCause-and-consequencerelation with high interest rates andfinancial profits) have increased furtherthe “revealed preference”for financial Strategies rather than industrial strategies.Moreover, trade strategies have become an important elementof TNCs S behaviour due, in part, to government adjustmentpolicies (export subsidies and import controls) and,in part, tothe needto look for external markets to offset the shrinkage ofthe domestic market. Hence, TNCs seem to have only started toupgradetheir industrial strategies as areactive phenomenontothe very deepcrisis that the Brazili ilast three years. an economyhashad in the
do TNCs respond to macroeconomic instabili Brazil ?specifically, Section 2 examinestherole ofTNCoinee.Moreofexternal adjustmentofthe Brazilian economy.In this regarda particularly sensitive issue relates to the trade Strategy ofTNCs in so far as the external disequilibrium and stroninflationarypressuresare thebasic elements ofmacroecono i.instability. Section 3 deals with financial Strategies usedby
c problems, most} , theinterest rates. Section 4d directly to the industrial
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strategies of TNCs, and largely due to the shrinkage of the
domestic market.
The lastsection presents asummaryofthe main conclusions
of the study. As far as TNCs’ general strategy for Brazil is
concerned, one concludes that TNCs seem presently to be in a
intermediary phase between a “standstill strategy” and a
“divestmentstrategy”, more specifically, TNCs are adopting a
“retrenchmentstrategy”.
With respect to the empirical evidence, analysis and
conclusions, a word of warning is in order here. The empirical
evidence presentedin this study is based on scattered data and
information that have been foundin the Brazilian press, mostly
in the last few years, as well as in the specialized literature on
TNCsin Brazil. In this regard, the scope for generalization is
rather limited. It would obviously be misleading to describe
general patterns of strategic behaviour on the basis of the
fragmentary evidence discussed in the paper. Without doubt,
the strategic behaviour of TNCs vis-a-vis macroeconomic
instability in Brazil should be the subjectoffurther research so
as to extend the analysis both in scope and in depth’.
2. The “Brazil Risk”.
This section deals with the impact of macroeconomic
instability on transnational corporations in Brazil. In this
regard, one examinesa basic question : How is the “Brazil risk”
perceived by TNCs?
_ Asmentioned, care mustbe takenininterpretingthe evidence
discussedin this section. The information presented hereis not
ased on a systematic survey as well as empirical studies on
Strategies of TNCs in Brazil are scarce. The analysis in this
Section is systematic to the extent that it aims at bringing
together the information available in the specialized literature
and in the presswith respect to the strategicbehaviourofTNCs.ne needsto interpretwithgreatcaution thepublic declarations,
“xpectations and intentions put forth by executives of TNCswhich are used in studies andpressarticles.
In addition to the normal commercial risks associated with
any business activity, transnational corporations are faced
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with three diferent types of risk which have a bearing on their
strategies®. They are the foreign exchangerisk, the political risk
and the administrative risk. The first one involves the
transactionsindifferentcurrencies related to trade and financial
flows. Thepolitical risk is associated with thefact that the TNChas important sources of economic and non-economic powerand, therefore, governments (mainly inless developed countries)
tend be concerned abouttheir sovereignty and the building upofcountervailingforces. The administrative risk is related to the
set of rules, laws and procedures which specifically regulatesee)operations (profitremittances, performance requirements,
etc).
Within these broad categoriesit is always possible to define
a more disaggregated list of factors which affect the generalbusiness environment®.Amongthesefactors it isworthpointingout the following: political stability, currency exchangeregulations, availability of labour, financial inducements by
government, barriers to trade, size of market, market growth,
price stability and performance requirements’. Nevertheless,it
seemsthatthere is aconsensus thatmarketsize and growth are
the most important locational determinants of foreign direct
investment®.
As far as the location-specific advantages of Brazil are
concerned this is an important conclusion. By and large,
market size and growth have been twobasic attributes of the
modern economic history of Brazil. Moreover, the general
investmentclimatehashistoricallybeenveryfavourable towards
foreign capital and enterprises.In this regard, itis worth notin
that Brazil ranked 12th in
a
list of60 less developed countries
classified according to their risk in 1988-89°. Most of thecountries in the first positions were either the newly-
industrializingcountries ofSouth-EastAsiaorthe oil-exporting
countries.
Without doubt, macroeconomic instability has become asignificant locational disadvantage for Brazil since the earl1980s.Indeed, mostofthe evidence found in the Pressindicatethat the main reasonsfor changesin Strategies vis-a-vis Brazil,asahostcountryforforeign direct investment, are the following:
macroeconomic instability and government intervention! &
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As far as macroeconomic instability is concerned,it is worth
emphasizing that the most basic and direct factorwhichaffects
TNCsis the stagnation ofthe domestic market during the “lost
decade”, mostly the deep recession of the period 1981-83 and
the stagnation of the period 1988-92. In this regard,it ight be
said that, althoughthe executives ofTNCshave aclearperception
that the external disequilibrium and the inflationary process
are key macroeconomic problems,these two issues affectTNCs’
perceptions and strategies in so far as they are the basic
determinants of expenditure-switching and, mainly,
expenditure- reducing policies aiming at macroeconomic
stabilization.
Of course, this is not to say that TNCs are notinfluenced by
the external debt crisis and the high inflation rates. As regards
the debt crisis, one can say that the structural balance- of-
payments disequilibrium hasnotled to anysignificantrestriction
on profit remittances or on any kind of capital transfer by
TNCs". In this connection it may be noted that the basic legal
instrument(Law N. 4131), which regulates foreign capital, has
in its article 28, a provision which allows governmentto limit
profit reittances in the case of serious balance-of-payments
disequilibrium!
Nor can the fact be ignored that TNCs havesignificant
€conomic and non-economic power which, in one way or
another, allow them to overcome the basic problem brought
about by a uncontrolled inflationary process, namely, the
transfer of income among social groups or economic agents.In
this regard, itmaybe pointed outthattheoligopolistic industries
in which TNCs predominate, such as, transport equipment,
Pharmaceutical products, rubber, have been amongthose with
a remarkable record of abusive pricing practices!”.
As far as governmentintervention is concerned, there are two
different aspects which have a major influence on TNCs. Thefirst one is very muchrelated to the previous discusssion about
the use of business practices and pricing policies (mostly, via
market power) to overcome the problems brought about by a
Strong inflationary process. Offoremost importanceforTNCsis
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price control. Thisis, probably, the issue mostoften found in thepublic displays ofTNCs’ positions.
The second issue is related to policy predictability. MoreSpecifically, in the context of significant macroeconomicinstability, TNCs are faced with a lack of policy predictabilitywhich has been the outcomeofgovernmentfailure to deal withthe stabilization problemsofthelast decadeor so. According toJoseph Mathews, Finance Director of Atlantic: “It is verydifficult to convince our shareholders to invest in a countrywhere the rules of the game are changed every time’.
It is interesting to note that, despite the political changes inthe recentpast- mostly, the transition from a military regimeto a civilian regime, and the impeachmentofthe first-electedpresident ofBrazil in the last fourtyyears -, political instabilityisnotseen,ingeneral, asanobstacle forforeign directinvestmentin Brazil. According to Zeke Wimert, presidentofthe AmericanChamberofCommerce:“Thepolitical crisishas affected neitherthe foreign investments in Brazil, nor the multinational
enterprises operating here”!*. Perhaps, on account of the
historical record, executives ofTNCs have a strong confidence
on the capacity of the Brazilian political elites for conciliation
and reform!
Moreover,it is hardly possible to overrate the value of the
basic legal instruments regulating foreign capital in Brazil] with
respect to the building up of a favourable investment climate.Since 1964 there has been no systematic complaints by TNCs
aboutthe Brazilian legislation. According to Fernando Albino
de Oliveira, lawyer and expert on legal aspects related to foreigndirect investment: “In spite of being old, the [Brazilian] law isextremely liberal to the extent that it does not define areas ofenforcement, allows the free flow of Currency and do not putmajor obstacles for investments”'®. Only in thelast couple ofyears, andin the context ofboth the liberalization Policies andthe chaotic administrative changesofthe Colloradministrationrepresentatives ofTNCsstarted to put pressure on governmentso as to changethislegislation.
Inthis regard,itisworthnotingthatsome ofthe admini :procedures,mostly related to theregistration of Strative
reinvestments,
10  
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ed according to the request madebyTNCs. The
aaeeecataryincome tax of40-60% on profit remittances has
also come to an end. The income withholding tax of 25% has
reduced to 15%’°.
a0ingtheTNCs’ perspective,itmightbe said that there have
been manypositive, valuable factors in the Brazilian economy,
factors that are in the long run likely to contribute to create a
favourable investment climate and, therefore, a qualified
optimism”. Here acouple ofquotationsseemjustified.Acccording
to Claudio Sonder, chairman of Hoechst, “Our confidence in
Brazil in the long runis greater than our disappointmentin the
short run”'”. Tadahisa Ando (an enthusiastic Managerof the
Mitsubishi Corporation) goes even further and asserts that
“Brazil has a very positive investment perspective, the future
seemsbright”!®. Thus, in the context of great macroeconomic
instability, TNCshavewhatcanbecalled a “qualified optimism
regarding the Brazilian economy.
3. Trade Strategies
The balance-of-payments problem of Brazil has been
characterized by extraordinary trade surpluses and enormous
external debt service (both of approximately US$ 130 billion
since 1981). Consequently, from a financial standpoint, the
external debt was “paid” with the trade surpluses.
In the last 15 years or so, TNCs have dramatically changed
their foreign trade performance, from a strongtradedeficit in
the mid-1970s to a significant trade surplus nowadays. This
changein the strategic behaviour of TNCs has been to a very
large extent determined by governmentpolicies oriented to
macroeconomicstabilization. Moreover, during the 1980s the
Stagnant domestic market led TNCs to look for alternative
outlets for their production in the external market. The export
drive became a matterof specific interest for the TNC.
Indeed, transnational enterprises have played a significant
Tole in the Brazilian foreign trade. Since the late mid-1970s
TNCshave changedtheir trade position, from deficit to surplus,
Owing to increases of their exports as well as to government
11
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import controls. The data for the period 1978-86 show annual
average exports and imports by subsidiaries and affiliates of
transnationals in Brazil ofUS$ 5.7 billion and US$ 3.0 billion,
that is, an annual average superavit of US$ 2.7 billion, which
corresponded to approximately 2/3 of Brazil's trade superavit
in theperiod'®. The available data for 1986 also indicate that
majority-owned subsidiaries in Brazil accounted for 18% of
total exports and 26% oftotal imports (excludingoil), whereasthe share of TNCsin total manufactured exports was 28%”.If
one takes into accountenterprises that are minority- owned
affiliates, the shareoftransnationals on manufactured exports
1S approximately 40%?!. As a result, there has been, as in the
secondhalf of the 1970s, an increase of the ratio of exports to
eneoffirms in Brazil, national and transnational
72,
It is important to point out that since the mid-1970s the
foreign trade behaviour ofTNCsin Brazil was characterized by
the fact that they benefited from extraordinary export incentives
and subsidies. Export promotion mechanisms have been
extensively used from the early 1970s until the late 1980s,
especially during the military regime?*. As a matter offact,
transnationalsreceived special incentives through mechanisms
that were especially created so as to stimulate the expansion of
their exports. On the basis of the available empirical evidence,
it can be said that the average subsidy/export ratio for
transnationals was approximately 50%‘. As a result,
transnationals received export subsidiesofatleast U$ 30billion
during the 1980s, that is, more than one-fourth ofthetotal
external debt of Brazil.
In addition to give a non-negligible contribution to the
balance-of-payments adjustmentthroughtrade surpluses, TNCs
have also Played a major role in moving upwards Brazil’spattern of comparative advantage. In view of th
incentives and subsidies given by the military gove
the overwhelmingpresence oftransnationals in the
sectors, it is no surprise that TNCs became res
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intensive products and for the upgrading of Brazil's export
structure”®.
It is worth emphasizing that the trade performance of
transnationals in Brazil was to large extent determined by
policy measures. In the early 1970s, before thefirst oil shock,
the motivation of the military to promote an outward-oriented
model of economic growth - based on rapid export expansion
and deeper penetration of transnational enterprises -, was
determined by economic,political and military-strategic factors”®.
As a matter of fact, the situation started to change with the
disequilibria causedby thefirst oil shock in 1974. In the context
of a deep desequilibrium in the balance of payments, the
policymakers, military and technocrats alike, started to apply
measures aiming at reducing “external vulnerabilities”. As a
result, they began to use an enormous and complex set of
incentives and subsidiesto stimulate exports.In addition, there
were importanttariff and non-tariff barriers, which meant a
strong control of imports, and these barriers were also very
powerful instruments to promote the structural reforms. That
is, the external disequilibrium of the second half of the 1970s
and the debtcrisis of the 1980s were the main determinants of
governmentpolicies, which affected significantly the trade
performanceof transnationals in Brazil.
Moreover, duringthe last decade the trade performance and
behaviour of TNCs were to a large extent influenced by the
sluggish domestic market. In this regard, the low level of
ports wasalso directly determined by a stagnant economy,
whereasthe export drive was analternative outlet for domestic
Production.
see last couple of years, however, the policy of trade
hand zation has had a bearing on TNCs’strategies. On the one
Has nothy can say that in these last twoyears tradeliberalization
of eiite ad a significant and direct impact on the performance
On Sop becauseof the gradual approachoftrade policy.
mode other hand, there seems to exist a consensusthat the
eae mization of industry in Brazil does require a reduction of
and non-tariff barriers inasmuch as protectionism has
13
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significantly contributed to market permissiveness, which hashindered c
,Ompetition and productivity growth.
As far astradeliberalization is concerned,it is worth pointingout thatit has brought about a “reverse import substitution”.Hence, there has been a reduction in the local content ofmanufactured goods inasmuch as TNCs arereplacing domestic
Sourcesof supply by imports. This process involves stopping
the verticalized Production by TNCs - de-verticalization has
been a phenomenon mentioned by TNCs executives in therecent surveys-, or bringing to an endtherelations with local
rend Suppliers. As an example, Xerox has been able
40% wiiha local contentofphotocopy machines from 90% to
Bina oi tea implied a cost reduction of 30%?7. Mercedes-Benz
atided that Ucing the local content to 50%". Here,it might be
duet another consequenceoftrade liberalization is theuction ofthe trade surplus of TNCs.
in lee the foreign trade behaviour and performance ofTNCs
Tazil have continuously changed since the mid- 1970s. Theexternal adjustment of the Brazilian economy led the
aee to induce TNCs, through different mechanisms
wedhee and carrot” Approach), to increase their exports and
periods ofon This phenomenon occurred even during the
During the oo of the economy (mostly, in 1974-80)”.
important d S decade, however, recession had become aneterminantof TNCs’ trade strategies.
4. Financial Strategies
Asa result ofa recessithere hasbeen q clear dowsdirect investme
1980s. The netfl
ineveasigste neeae of foreign direct investment have become
that the remittance ateseB,theastew years.
As a matter 9; Os have increased in he las fewy rs”
f fact, :
consequenceofthe ia© reduction of foreign investment is a
environment andgreat uncertainty,
nts ii wnwardtrendofthe net flows offoreignnto the Brazilian economysince the early
* Tr 5their plantsin Braziy, Dateg ofcapital expenditures by TNCsin
4 fora sample of 58 large TNCs show
14
MactoeconomicInstability and the Strategiesof Transnational Corporationsin Brazil: Standstill, Refrenchmentor Divestment?
an average yearly reduction of 3.1% offixed assets and 2.4% of
total assets during the period 1984- 89°',
Given the macroeconomic instability, TNCs have also adopted
aclearstrategyofsharp reduction oftheirlevels ofindebtedness“.
As a matterof fact, this is a general phenomenonassociated
with the strategies of large private enterprises, transnational
and national alike, since the early 1980s. Indeed, the present
levels of indebtednessofthe large private enterprises in Brazil
are very low. Moreover, there has been
a
restructuringof the
assets of large TNCs in terms of growing diversification of
investments in associated firms. The strategy of minimising
financial risks involves the distribution of the portfolios of
TNCs*. This trend is more evident after 1984.
Of foremost importanceis the capacity of TNCsto increase
their grossprofit rates (“mark-up”) during stronginflationary
andrecessive periods. This phenomenonis not a “privilege” of
TNCsin so far as large local firms have also benefited from
pricing mechanismsto maintain theirlevels of profit.
The macroeconomic instability led TNCs also to take
advantageofrelatively high interest rates in Brazil during the
last decade.In this regard, the financial profits have become an
increasingsource ofresources forTNCs.This “defensive financial
Strategy” implies, inter alia, that TNCs have looked for greater
flexibility reagarding the use oftheir resources, as well as they
have beenableto keepsignificant internal funds (mostly from
financial gains) for capital accumulation. According to an
analyst, “the intensification of the “recessive and inflationary’
chaviour of both the private local and foreign capital must
‘ave been a major determinantof their adjustmentpolicies of
Since 1988", Thatis, large local firms and TNCshavebenefited
meat macroeconomicinstability via financial profits and pricing
chanisms (mark-upincreases).
import as the foreign exchange risk is concerned, it is
in 1968 Nt to bear in mindthat the crawling-pegsystem adopted
gains Wasonly eliminated in 1990. Hence, one can say that
shore losses from currency changes were minimized in the
ind Tun on accountofthe predictability - via foreign exchange
€xation - of the exchangerates. This is not to say that the
15
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risks were null all over the period. There were instances of
strong devaluations (around 30%) which created risks. Besides,
itisworth notingthat there hasbeen acleartrend ofovervaluation
ofthe Brazilian currency since the mid- 1980s. In this connection
it has to be noted thatTNCs (mostly the automobilefirms) have
persistently complained about the valuation of the Brazilian
currency during the last decade*.
Since 1990 the foreign exchange rate policy (a “bastard
floating system”) has also created a new elementofuncertainty
andinstability. Hence, it may be said that the foreign exchange
risk for TNCs would haveincreased since 1990. There is no
evidence that TNCs are adopting new systems for managing
exchangerate exposurein Brazil. However, the forward exchange
market and the de-regulamentation of the exchange market
have allowed them to reduce their exposure. TNCs can also
engage in hedge operations through,for instance, the Purchaseof export notes that minimize their economic exposure as q
result of unexpected changes in exchangerates**.
Amongthe changesin regulation, it is worth noting that
“companies with a registered foreign participation can open
foreign exchange accounts, which can be credited with new
foreign direct investments and re-investments,reserve Profits
consolidated surplus,profit remittances, and returns and Zains
from profit remittances. Deposits are at LIBOR and normally
require 90 days notice for withdrawals, or 30 days in the cases
of deposits from profits or dividends and sales of investments
andparticipating capital stocks”*’.
Moreover,it is likely that TNCs have increased the use oftransferpricing mechanismsin their external trade transactions
as a wayof divestment. There are some reasonsfor that. First
the great relative importance ofTNCsin Brazil’s external trade.Second, TNCshavebillions ofdollars ofassets in Brazil, whoseeconomy has been stagnated. Third, despite the domesti
market crisis, TNCs have been able to obtain Profits, Fauch,
TNCs seem to have an excessofinternal funds that are beer,mostly oriented to financial investments and investm “a
associated firms. ents in
16
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Onthe basisof the above considerations, one can advance
the argument that TNCs seem to be adopting a “standstill
strategy” in Brazil in the last few years. The financial strategy
hasinvolved
a
clear reduction ofinflowsof foreign capital and
anettransfer ofresourcesto their parent companies.A “defensive
financial strategy” has been used to manage internal funds
which have beenoriented to the domestic financial and capital
markets so as to benefit from high interest rates. Financial
profits haveoffset the reduction ofoperational profits caused by
the recessive situation. Moreover, TNCs have used their market
powerand,via the pricing formation mechanism, have been
able to obtain relatively high mark-ups in a stagnated and
unstable economy.
5. Industrial Strategies
The industrial strategic behaviour of TNCs may be better
understood ifone makesa distinction between the technological-
organizational restructuring and the investment-production
strategy.
Thefirst issue has beenanalyzed in a rather systematic way
in recent works**. The evidence available indicates that there
has been an increase in the technological and organizational
gap, both oflarge local firms and subsidiaries of transnational
corporations. These firms tend to have a similar behaviour with
Tespect to their perceptions about the the urgent need to
modernize in terms of R&D activities, new organizational
Procedures, moreefficient production techniques, scale and
Scope economies, more qualified labour-force and the increase
of competitiveness”.
On the other hand, the evidence shows the low level of
diffusion ofmodern technical procedures, suchas,the industrial
automation and organizational innovations, such as, the just-
In- time relations with suppliers. To illustrate, Autolatina (Ford+ Volkswagen) have only started a just-in-time organizational
network with suppliers on a large scale in 1992*°. Here, one of
the objectives is to reduce costs through lower stocks. In
addition, Autolatina is aiming at a reduction ofits degree of
17
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verticalization. The introducton ofnew organizational techniques
is intendedto allow the largest car producerin Brazil to achieve
greater competitiveness.
The evolution of the economic crisis since the end of the
1980s seems to have shaken TNCs so that they became
probably more conscious aboutthe urgent need ofrestructuring.
As a result, TNCs seem to be engaged in Strategies aiming at
greater efficiency through“important managerial changes, the
rationalization of the production process, the introduction of
new organizational techniques, output specialization and thereduction ofvertical integration”*'. Without doubt,this processof structural adjustment in the context of a deep recessioninvolves,firstofall, the sizing down ofplants and, secondly, theclosedownoffactories. Both Strategies imply the dismissal ofworkers.
To illustrate this last aspect, Dow Chemical stopped theproduction ofsome chemical products(e.g., varnishes)in Brazilbecause of the recession. Alcan has closed one of the twofurnacesofits aluminium factory in Bahia. Evenjoint-ventures
operationswith Sanbra, which produced cleansingpreparations,have been discontinued. Ford seems to take a strategy ofdivestment in Brazil after its minority association withVolkskwagen and,also, decided for closing up of a car engineplant in Sao Paulo in 1991*2,
Nevertheless, the modernization and restructuring of TNCsin Brazil also involve Strategiesactively oriented to the reductionofcosts, improvementofproduct qualityand greaterproductivity.In this regard, TNCs are active in the formation of joint-ventures,for instance,in mining (mostly, gold production)”.Moreover, some analysts are even forecasting a wave offusions and acquisitionsin Brazil in the near future. However,
the evidenceis insufficient to support this argument. Suffice itto say here thatthere important examplesofrecent fusions inindustries, such as, chemicals and metallurgy. The fusion ofShell Chemicals and theitalian Montecatini of their divisions ofpolyprophylene and polyethylene will very probably lead to afusion of their operations in Brazil through their respectivesubsidiaries (Polibrasil and PPH)**. The fusion ofHoeschAG and
18
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Fried Krupp AG in Germanyhaveled to a restructuringoftheir
respective subsidiaries in Brazil (Hoesch Industria de Molas
Ltda e Krupp Metalurgica Campo Limpo Ltda). There has
already been the fusion of some departments (e.g., data
processing) and thedefinition of a single policy vis-a-vis their
common suppliers*®.
The fusion activities have also affected large local firms in
Brazil. The production of locomotive was a duopoly of General
Electric andVillares until two years ago. The deep recession led
both enterprises to decide for establishing a single plant, with
the transfer ofthe equipmentsofVillaresto the plant ofGeneral
Electric in Campinas, Sado Paulo. There is now an evident
monopolistic market structure.
The restructuring of TNCs hasalso been based on fusions
and strategic alliances involving subsidiaries of TNCsin other
countries of Latin America. The recenttrade agreements, such
as, Mercosul, have created better conditions for this intra-
regional restructuring ofTNCs. For instance, Dow Chemicalis
restructuringits production ofsynthetic rubberlatex inArgentina
and Brazil’. The trade agreement with Argentina has also a
specific protocol on road motorvehicles and parts and acessories
which, without doubt, allows TNCs the restructuring of
Production and the redeployment of resources. TNCs like
Scania, Cummins, Mercedes-Benz, Fiat, Ford, Volskwagen,
and Volvo have benefited from the protocol in orderto expand
their intra-firm transactions.In this regard, it is worth noting
that Volvo (Brazil) and Renault (Argentina) have, recently,
announced an agreementof cooperation*®. The protocol on
parts andtires has benefited several TNCs with subsidiaries in
Brazil and Argentina, suchas,Pirelli and Cibié*®. The protocol
oncapital goodshasalso benefited the restructuring process ofTNCsin sofar as they control half of this industry in Brazil®,
Thestrategic behaviour ofTNCs has also involved the take-
Over of local firms. As a matter of fact, the long and deeprecession ofthe last few years hasfacilitated the formation of
Joint ventures as well as the take-over of local firms. As an
example of a take-over involving a medium-size firm, one canmention the case of the American trading company United
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Manda Inc. that bought the very last national producer of
cigarettes (Companhia Sudan de Produtos de Tabaco), whose
market share is 4% and, consequently, domestic production is
now the hands of TNCs (with the predominance of BAT and
Phillip Morris)*'. The acquisition of a relatively large firm,leading producer of cleansing products (Orniex SA), by anItalianTNC (Brill Spa) is anotherinteresting example inasmuchas Orniex is a profitable enterprise®,
Moreover, TNCsare taking advantage of recession and thefragility of local firms to penetrate into Some markets. Thatisthe case,for instance,ofnational private trading companies ofcacao operating in the Southern region ofBahia that are goingbankrupt. TNCs dealing with commodities are benefiting fromthis situation to become important buyers of cacao in thisregion”. Moreover, the end ofthe marketreserve mechanism inthe informatics industryhasbroughtaboutseveralpartnershipsbetweenlocal firms and TNCs.5*+ Microelectronicsis likely to beoneofthe mostimportantindustriesforinvestmentopportunities(most probablyviajoint-ventures and acquisitions) in Brazil in
the near future.
Inaddition to the above changes inTNCs’ strategic behaviour,
it is worth noting that there has also been changes in termsof
product mix. In this regard, and despite the recession and
macroeconomic instability, Unilever through its subsidiary
Gessy Leveris introducing a “global product”in Brazil - a soap
called Dove. The main reasonfor this initiative is that Brazil hasa large domestic market even for sophisticated products®®.A number of reasons have been advanced to explain whyTNCs have adopted the above mentioned strategies. Without
doubt, recession and macroeconomic instability are the major
determinants.
6. Conclusions
These general concluding remarks should be preceded by acomment: the fragmentary empirical information presented inthe last two sections, used to provide some evidence in support
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of the arguments, should best be seen as suggestive or
avoreigncapital has had a bearing upon the longterm
evolution ofthe Brazilian economy. It meansthat, regardlessot
short- ormedium-term fluctuations and changes, foreign capi al
and firms have been faced with a propitious and liber:
environmentinBrazil. Inviewofthe historical record and taking
a long-term perspective, there is no doubt that Brazil has
always been an effective and potential market for foreign
indeed, the market size and the potential market growth
have been the main locational-specific advantages of the
Brazilian economy. Moreover, there are institutional, social,
political and even cultural factors in Brazil that havea major
andpositive influence onTNCs’ expectations. The institutional
and legal framework are quite liberal. The non-discriminatory
and even favourable treatment received by foreign goods,
services and investorsis part of a socio-cultural process with
strong roots in migration flows. Lastly, there is in Brazil a
predominance - obtained both by consent and by force -, of
values andbeliefs, thathavebeen internalized by theelites and,
probably, by the other social groups. This hegemony isa
valuable locational- specific advantagewhich implies, interalia,
the predominanceofthe “logic ofthe market”(including, market
ower) and the“logic of capital’.
° In thie connection it is importantto pointout thatTNCshave
a significant economic powerin Brazil. The extent to which the
€conomic and non-economic powerin Brazil is concentrated in
a handful of enterprises is indicated, for instance, by the fact
that the 25 largest subsidiaries ofTNCs are responsible for 52%
ofthe total sales ofthe 550 largest non-financial transnationals
in Brazil®*, Here, it may be added thatthe largest 53 exporters
and importers amongTNCswere responsible for20% ofBrazil’s
total manufactured exports and total imports®’. Most of the
technology-intensive industries are controlled by TNCs. Even
though TNCstend to predominate in industries in which the
Size of the enterprises is important, TNCs are also presentin
industries with the predominance of small and medium-size
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enterprises. Indeed, foreign capital - small, medium and large-
sizeTNCs-, permeates Brazilian manufacturing®*.TNCsaccount
for an average share of73.7 percent ofproduction, 74.3 percent
of employment, 55.1% percentof capital and 7.9 percent of
establishments of industries with the predominance of large-
size enterprises. Bycontrast, in industrieswith the predominance
ofsmall enterprises, TNCs represent29.3 percentofproduction,
26.0 percent of employment, 13.5 percent of capital and 1.4
percent of the numberof establishments®. By and large, the
degree of predominance of TNCs in manufacturing tends to
increasewith thepredominanceoflargerenterprises in industry.
Without doubt, these aspects represent important economic
sources of transnationals’ powerin Brazil. As a matter of fact,
transnational enterprises have agreat numberofeconomic and
non-economic sources of power in a developing country like
Brazil®.
In the last decade, macroeconomic instability has hadsignificanteffectsonTNCs’ performance and Strategicbehaviour
in Brazil. By and large, TNCs havebeenquitefastin responding
through trade flows - a phenomenon largely due to government
policies, controls, subsidies and incentives from the mid- 1970s
until the late 1980s, and deep recession on account of
expenditure-reducing policies in the last few years. TNCs have
also had aspeedyresponsein termsoffinancial Strategies in the
context of macroeconomic instability characterized by high
inflation and highinterest rates. TNCshave adapted themselves
to the situation via, for instance, a significant reduction ofindebtedness, and they have benefited from macroeconomic
instability through substantive financial profits. As far as
industrial restructuring is concerned,it seems that TNCs have
being operating in slow-motion. The high degree of market
permissiveness (i.e., great marketpower cumtrade barriers), as
well as the success ofTNCs’ financial and trade Strategies arelikely to be the main reasonsforthis typeofindustrial Strategicbehaviour.
The argumentthatTNC is going to invest in Brazil as soon asthe estabilization problems are overcome can be misleading®!.
Fist of all, TNCs have a high level of financial liquidity and,
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therefore, it is likely that the new capital expenditures will
carried out with internal fundsin national currency. Thatis, no
direct balance-of-payments effect, except for a reduction of
profit remittances. Secondly, the level of idle capacity is quite
high in most sectorsin Brazil. In this regard,it will happen that
recovery will be based on presentinstalled capacities rather
than newinvestments. Thirdly, anewwaveofprivate investment
implies a time gap after the achievement of macroeconomic
stabilization. It meansthatthe inflow ofsubstantive resources
from parent companiesis not foreseen in the near future.
Moreover, it is worth mentioning the “hostage argument”.
According to some analysts, TNCs have a stock ofbillions of
dollars in Brazil and,therefore, an attemptofmassivewithdrawal
implies that their sunk costs would be very high. It means that
a strategy of divestment could not be undertaken on a large
scale. However,itseemsofdubiousvalue to analyze investment
stretegies of TNCs in terms of a binary question: Leave the
country or not leave the country ?
This binary perspective conflicts bluntly with the history and
theory offoreign directinvestment. Bothforeign directinvestment
and divestmentinvolve a long-term perspective. By and large,
locational-specific advantagesordisadvantages tend to change
gradually over time. They are much more stock-related factors
than flow-related factors (i.e., one often deals with location-
specific endownments)®.
Parent companies have reduced Significantly theirinvestmentsin their subsidiaries in Brazil. There has also beena net transfer of resources to the home country. By andlarge,
transnational corporations are not usingtheir internal funds to
expand their fixed assets. These internal funds have been
reinvested in the financial and capital markets, as well as thereseems to exist diversification of risks with investments inassociated firms. On the other hand, there are no massivedivestmentflows®®.
.._ By andlarge, one hasthe impression that TNCsadopted aStandstill Strategy” with respect to Brazil all over the lastdecade.This Strategy involved “stopping investments, lowlevels
of production, high prices and waiting for events”**,
23
Textos para Discussao
Moreover,the basic argumentis that TNCs have adopted a
retrenchment strategy in the last few years. That is, TNCs are
moving from the standstill strategy, which seems to have
predominatedsincethe early 1980's, toa retrenchmentstrategy
brought about by the deep economiccrisis of the last three
years. Hence, while it is true that TNCs recognize the urgent
need to engage in deeprestructuring,it is probably even truer
that they are keeping a low profile with respectto the Brazilian
market.
The fundamental question is the following: Why have TNCs
notshifted from a standstillstrategy to a more drastic divestment
initiative ? In other words: Why are TNCsina rather transitional
phase, adopting a retrenchment strategy?®®
The simple answer is that, in part, the market size and
potential of Brazil are still major locational advantages.In part,
it may have been that TNCs are having reasonable rates of
rentability for their capital invested in Brazil, mostly through
financial market operations and the exercise of market power,
and, perhaps, through transfer pricing mechanismsin their
foreign tradeactivities.
Atthis point the reader may very naturally ask:If there had
beennopersistent pattern ofsky-high interestrates in Brazil in
the last fewyears, wouldTNCs have carried outa more open and
aggressive divestment strategy ?
The sametype ofquestion might be asked with respectto thetransfer Pricing mechanisms (external trade) and the priceformation mechanism in the domestic market(via mark-up): Ifthere had been noexcessive market power, would TNCs have
kept their “standstill strategy” in the context of great
macroeconomic instability ?
These questions deserve answers. Given the depth and the
scope ofthe macroeconomiccrisis in Brazil, it is likely thatTNCs
would be undertakingmoreopen andactive divestment strategiesifthere had been no market permissiveness (TNCs extraordinarymarket power) and absurd monetary policies (extremelly highinterest rates) in the last few years. The core ofthe Problem isthat these mechanismsdoreinforce stabilization problems|
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Here,it is worth digressing for a momenton the comparative
behaviour of TNCs and large domestic groups. The evidence
suggests that in growth periods there seemsto exist no significant
differences in the performance of TNCs and large domestic
enterprises regarding profitability, growth rates, productivity,
choice of technology, technological spill-overs, external trade
and so on, whendifferences in size and product mix are taken
into account®. During periods of macroeconomic instabilityand stagnation, however, it may happenthat the greater degree
of freedom of TNCs,with respect to the transfer of resources
across national frontiers, has a bearing on TNCs’ financial
strategies. That is, net transfers of resources to the parentcompany appears as an alternative channel for the use ofsubsidiaries internal funds.This alternative is ratherlimited inthe case of domestic groups.
Hence, one can advance the argumentthat, as far as tradeand industrial strategies are concerned, TNCs and large domesticgroups seem to be undertaking the same Strategies in the lastfew years, mainly, on accountof a common environment’.Notwithstanding the similarity of aspects of the financialStrategies (e.g., lower indebtedness) of large domestic groupsand TNCs,thelatter haverelied on net transfers of resources toParent companies. In this regard, the origin of ownershipmatters!





Isit time for promotinggreater liberalization
or introducing performance requirements ? These will go on
being key questions in the political and economic agenda,
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